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Abstract
Studies indicate that rumination might play a role in obsessive–compulsive disorder. In a previous
experimental study, rumination about an unwanted intrusive thought (UIT) maintained the urge to
neutralize this thought. We sought to replicate and extend these findings with measures of behavioral
and mental neutralizing. Additionally, we investigated possible mechanisms that might be involved in the
effects of rumination on the UIT. We activated a UIT by asking students (N ¼ 105) to write down a
sentence stating that they wished a loved person would die in a car accident. Participants were randomly
allocated to rumination about the UIT, rumination about negative mood, or distraction. As predicted,
rumination about the UIT maintained the urge to neutralize the UIT, relative to rumination about
negative mood and distraction. In addition, rumination about the UIT also maintained distress
associated with the UIT compared to rumination about negative mood and distraction. The effects of
rumination did not extend to behavioral or mental neutralizing. UIT frequency and vividness were
unaffected by rumination. The present findings strengthen the confidence that rumination contributes
to the maintenance of UITs.
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Introduction
Individuals with obsessive–compulsive disorder
(OCD) typically experience distressing obsessive
thoughts (Rachman, 1997, 1998; Salkovskis, 1985),
defined as “recurrent and persistent thoughts, urges,
or images that are experienced, at some time during
the disturbance, as intrusive and unwanted, and that in
most individuals cause marked anxiety or distress”
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 237).
Once an obsession enters the mind, there are multiple
behavioral and mental strategies an individual with
OCD can use to respond (Freeston & Ladouceur,
1997). Analyzing the thought, its reasons, and causes
has been identified as one of these strategies (Freeston
& Ladouceur, 1997). This indicates that obsessive
thoughts might be followed by rumination about the
obsessive thoughts. For example, individuals diag-
nosed with OCD might ruminate about why they can-
not get rid of their obsessive thoughts, what reasons
caused the obsessive thoughts in the first place, and
what might happen if the obsessive thoughts persist.
Rumination is defined as passive repetitive think-
ing about symptoms of distress and its causes, mean-
ings, and consequences (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991).
Although originally researched in the area of depres-
sion (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema
et al., 2008), rumination has been associated with a
number of mental disorders, such as anxiety (Harring-
ton & Blankenship, 2002), alexithymia (Di Schiena
et al., 2011), eating disorders (Naumann et al., 2015),
and sleeping disorders (Carney et al., 2013). In addi-
tion, Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2007) demonstrated that
rumination might convey a risk of the onset of psy-
chopathology. In their study, prior rumination
increased the risk of subsequent onset of major
depression, recurrent binge eating, and substance
abuse over a 3-year period.
A number of studies with nonclinical individuals
have demonstrated associations between rumination
and obsessive–compulsive (OC) symptoms. For
instance, Grisham and Williams (2009) and Wahl,
Ertle et al. (2011) showed that the tendency to rumi-
nate was positively correlated with OC symptoms in
student samples. Studies with clinical samples indi-
cated that ruminative thoughts occur as frequently as
obsessive thoughts in individuals diagnosed with
OCD (Wahl, Schönfeld et al., 2011). Dar and Iqbal
(2015) found positive correlations between rumina-
tion and OC symptoms in a mixed sample of individ-
uals diagnosed with OCD or generalized anxiety
disorder. Rumination was related to the unacceptable
thoughts/neutralization domain of OCD when nega-
tive affect was controlled for in an unselected
treatment-seeking sample (Raines et al., 2017).
Overall, these studies indicate an association
between rumination and OCD symptoms and raise
the question of whether and in what way they might
influence each other.
Wahl et al. (2019) investigated the immediate
rumination effects on the distress associated with an
unwanted intrusive thought (UIT), the urge to neutra-
lize it, depressed mood, and the frequency of this
thought in an experimental study. Rumination about
the UIT led to an attenuated decrease of the urge to
neutralize the UIT in comparison to rumination about
negative mood and distraction. This means that rumi-
nation might contribute to the maintenance of intru-
sive thoughts by reducing the natural decrease of the
urge to act upon them. The authors did not find an
effect of rumination about the UIT on the distress,
depressed mood, or frequency of the UIT.
Several mechanisms by which rumination might
influence the persistence of intrusive thoughts have
been discussed. Raines et al. (2017) suggested that
rumination might promote the misinterpretation of
naturally occurring intrusive thoughts by changing the
appraisals of these thoughts. This idea was supported
in the previous experimental study (Wahl et al.,
2019). Rumination about the UIT resulted in a stron-
ger belief that the thought might come true relative to
rumination about negative mood and distraction. This
suggests that ruminating about one’s UITs might
strengthen dysfunctional appraisals of the UIT. In
addition, rumination could result in the persistence
of negative mood. Negative mood increases the fre-
quency of intrusive thoughts (Clark, 2002; Reynolds
& Salkovskis, 1991) resulting in a vicious circle of
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negative mood and intrusive thoughts (Wahl, Schön-
feld, et al., 2011). Moreover, Grisham and Williams
(2009) suggested that rumination might fuel the fre-
quency of intrusive thoughts by increasing their
accessibility as a result of a quicker spread of activa-
tion in the semantic network. Previous research has
demonstrated a clear association between rumination
and frequency of intrusive cognitions such as intru-
sive memories (James et al., 2016; Luo et al., 2013;
White & Wild, 2016). For example, White and Wild
(2016) showed that individuals who were trained to
adopt an abstract mode of processing—such as rumi-
nation—in response to a traumatic film reported more
intrusive memories than individuals who were trained
to adopt a concrete processing style. Abstract process-
ing was defined as rumination focused on the reasons,
meanings, and consequences of the traumatic event
and concrete processing was characterized by focus-
ing on the concrete details of the event. In another
study, rumination clearly correlated positively with
intrusion frequency (Zetsche et al., 2009). Taken
together, these results lead us to expect rumination
about a UIT to affect not just the urge to neutralize
the UIT but also the associated distress, depressed
mood, frequency, and negative appraisals of the
thought.
Two further candidates that might be involved in
the effects of rumination on UITs are trait rumination
and thought–action fusion (TAF). Trait rumination
refers to the tendency to ruminate in daily life (Just
& Alloy, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, 2000). Stud-
ies indicate that higher levels of trait rumination are
associated with greater negative emotional outcomes
(Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Watkins, 2004). TAF is
the belief that experiencing an unacceptable thought
is morally equivalent to acting according to the
thought or that mere thinking about a particular event
makes it more likely to happen (Rachman, 1997,
1998; Rassin et al., 2001; Salkovskis, 1985; Shafran
et al., 1996). The effects of rumination on UITs might
be particularly pronounced for individuals who have a
strong tendency to ruminate or who strongly endorse
beliefs about TAF. In this way, trait rumination and
TAF might moderate the effects of rumination on
UITs.
Finally, rumination might change the vividness of a
UIT. In one study, a majority (81%) of individuals
with OCD reported having mental images (Speckens
et al., 2007). These images were mainly visual and
were experienced as distressing and vivid (Lipton
et al., 2010). Intrusive images in OCD seem to occur
more frequently than in anxiety disorders, are less
often associated with past memories, and are typically
viewed from a person’s own vantage point rather than
from an observer’s perspective (Lipton et al., 2010).
Rumination has been identified as one of the main
triggers of intrusive images (Birrer et al., 2007), and
one can assume that rumination affects the vividness
of UITs (Birrer et al., 2007; Pearson et al., 2013).
The present study seeks to further clarify the immi-
nent effect of rumination on UITs by replicating and
extending previous findings by Wahl et al. (2019).
The first aim was to replicate their main finding
(rumination on a UIT attenuates the decline in the
urge to neutralize) using an identical experimental
paradigm in an independent sample. The second aim
was to extend these findings by including measures of
actual behavioral and mental neutralizing. While
Wahl et al. (2019) investigated the urge to neutralize,
an even stronger indication of the effects of rumina-
tion on UITs would be changes in actual neutraliza-
tion. Additionally, we investigated several possible
mechanisms that might be related to the influences
of rumination on UITs.
We hypothesized that, relative to distraction and
rumination about negative mood, rumination about a
UIT would attenuate the natural waning of the urge to
neutralize the UIT (replication of previous main
result, Hypothesis 1). We additionally hypothesized
that distress, depressed mood, and UIT frequency
would decrease to a smaller degree after rumination
about a UIT than after rumination about negative
mood and distraction (Hypothesis 2a, b, and c). To
extend the previous findings, we predicted that actual
behavioral and mental neutralizing would be more
pronounced after rumination about a UIT than after
rumination about negative mood and distraction
(Hypothesis 3a and b).
Concerning the potential mechanisms, we pre-
dicted that trait rumination and TAF, respectively,
would moderate the relation between rumination
about a UIT and the urge to neutralize (Hypothesis
4a and b). Specifically, we expected that the higher
the level of trait rumination, the stronger the effects of
rumination about a UIT on the urge to neutralize
would be. Similarly, we predicted that the higher the
TAF beliefs, the stronger the rumination about a UIT
would affect the urge to neutralize. Furthermore, we
hypothesized that rumination about a UIT would
increase the negative appraisals of the UIT in com-
parison to rumination about negative mood and dis-
traction (Hypothesis 5). Finally, we examined
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whether rumination about a UIT would affect the UIT
vividness in comparison to rumination about negative
mood and distraction in an exploratory analysis.
Method
Participants
All participants (N ¼ 105) were undergraduate psy-
chology students recruited at the University of Basel
(Mage ¼ 22.35 years, SD ¼ 4.94; 89 females,
16 males). For their participation, they received
course credit. During the experimental manipulation,
the participants were randomly allocated to rumina-
tion about a UIT (UIT rumination group; n ¼ 34),
rumination about negative mood (mood rumination
group; n ¼ 35), or distraction (n ¼ 36). The experi-
mental groups did not differ in sociodemographic
variables, positive or negative affect, depressive
symptoms, OC symptoms, degree of brooding, or
degree of TAF, all ps > .05 (see Table 1 for means
and standard deviations [SDs]). The study was
reviewed and approved by the institutional review
board of the University of Basel (approval number:
IRB 009-16-1).
Measures
Standardized questionnaires. The Positive and Negative
Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988; Ger-
man version: Krohne et al., 1996) is a measure of
positive (10 items) and negative (10 items) affect with
good reliability and validity (Crawford & Henry,
2004; Krohne et al., 1996). In this study, we measured
the affect experienced within the last 12 months.
Cronbach’s a was high in the current sample (for
positive affect, a ¼ .81; for negative affect, a ¼ .84).
The Obsessive–Compulsive Inventory–Revised
(OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002; German version: Goenner
et al., 2007) is an 18-item self-report measure of OC
symptoms consisting of six subscales (washing,
obsessions, hoarding, ordering, neutralizing, and
checking). The scale possesses good psychometric
properties (Goenner et al., 2007, 2008). In the current
sample, the internal consistency of the total scale was
high with Cronbach’s a ¼ .85.
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al.,
1979; German version: Hautzinger et al., 1995) is a
21-item self-report measure of depressive symptoms.
The BDI is a widely used instrument in research with
good reliability and validity (Beck et al., 1988). In this
sample, Cronbach’s a ¼ .84.
The Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; German version: Kueh-
ner et al., 2007) is a 22-item self-report questionnaire
that measures trait rumination. For this study, we used
only the 5-item brooding scale (RRS-brood), which
measures unproductive self-focused responses to sad
mood. We chose this subscale because it is not con-
taminated by items focusing on depression (Treynor
et al., 2003). For our study, we used RRS-brood to
operationalize trait rumination. Psychometric proper-
ties of the brooding subscale are satisfactory (Treynor
et al., 2003). Cronbach’s a was acceptable in this
sample (a ¼ .70).
The Thought–Action Fusion Scale (TAFS; Shafran
et al., 1996; German version: Hansmeier et al., 2014)
is a self-report measure of TAF consisting of two
subscales: TAF-moral (12 items) and TAF-
likelihood (7 items). The former focuses on a morality
Table 1. Sociodemographic variables, affect, and clinical characteristics.
Variable
Experimental group
UIT rumination (n ¼ 34) Mood rumination (n ¼ 35) Distraction (n ¼ 36)
Age 21.74 (5.1) 21.69 (3.22) 23.58 (5.97)
Gender (% female) 79.4 88.6 86.1
PANAS: positive 34.59 (5.58) 33.20 (5.48) 33.08 (4.97)
PANAS: negative 23.44 (6.14) 23.51 (6.52) 22.47 (6.38)
OCI-R total 16.00 (8.57) 19.03 (11.70) 16.08 (7.81)
BDI 7.65 (5.44) 8.23 (7.51) 8.92 (4.98)
RRS-brood 11.00 (4.10) 10.69 (2.99) 10.11 (3.12)
TAFS total 22.09 (11.61) 24.37 (12.42) 24.56 (12.15)
Note. All values except for gender are means with standard deviations in parentheses. BDI ¼ Beck Depression Inventory, OCI-R ¼
Obsessive–Compulsive Inventory, Revised, PANAS ¼ Positive and Negative Affect Schedule, RRS-brood ¼ Ruminative Responses
Scale, brooding subscale, TAFS ¼ Thought–Action Fusion Scale, UIT ¼ unwanted intrusive thought.
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bias and the latter on a probability bias. The TAF-
likelihood further differentiates between negative
consequences to oneself (TAF-LS) and to others
(TAF-LO). The psychometric properties of the scale
are good (Hansmeier et al., 2014; Meyer & Brown,
2013; Rassin et al., 2001). In our study, Cronbach’s a
for the total TAFS score was .89.
The Revised Obsessive Intrusions Inventory Part
2 (ROII Part 2; Purdon & Clark, 1993, 1994) was
used to measure the appraisals of the activated
UIT. We used 8 of the 10 appraisal items to assess
unpleasantness of the UIT, a sense of guilt associ-
ated with the UIT, worry that the UIT would come
true, unacceptability of the UIT, perceived likeli-
hood of the UIT coming true, the importance of
controlling the UIT, perceived harm or danger
associated with the UIT, and perceived responsibil-
ity for the UIT coming true. We employed this
measure to get an indication of the similarity in
appraisal ratings between the induced UIT in our
study and appraisals in individuals with OC symp-
toms. All items were rated on a 5-point Likert-type
scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely).
Assessment of distress, urge to neutralize, depressed
mood, and vividness of UITs. Participants were asked
to rate distress (“How distressed are you right now?”),
urge to neutralize (“To what degree do you experi-
ence an urge to neutralize the UITs, that is, to undo the
intrusive thought or to do something to prevent some-
thing bad happening?”), depressed mood (“How
depressed are you right now?”), and vividness of the
UITs (“Please indicate how vivid your intrusive
thoughts are, that is, to what degree they appear as
vivid images in your mind.”) on visual analog scales
(VASs) ranging from 0 (very low/not at all vivid) to 9
(very high/extremely vivid).
Assessment of UIT frequency. We assessed UIT fre-
quency with a smartphone counter app. Participants
were instructed to press the “þ” volume button when-
ever the UIT occurred. The display was covered so
that participants could not see the counter app.
Manipulation checks. To check whether the experimen-
tal manipulation worked, the participants were asked
to rate their concentration (“What percentage of time
were you able to concentrate on the sentences
shown?”), degree of self-focus (“While the statements
were presented, to what degree were you thinking
about yourself?”), and degree of UIT focus (“While
the statements were presented, to what degree were
you thinking about causes, meaning, and conse-
quences of your intrusive thoughts or images?”) on
VASs ranging from 0% to 100%. If the manipulation
was effective, participants in the distraction condition
should score lower on both self-focus and UIT-focus
variables in comparison to those in the rumination
groups. In addition, participants in the UIT rumina-
tion group should be less self-focused and more UIT
focused than those in the mood rumination group.
Assessment of behavioral and mental neutralizing. To
assess behavioral and mental neutralizing strategies,
we modified items of previous work in that area
(Freeston et al., 1991; Goodman et al., 1989; Purdon
& Clark, 1993, 1994; Rachman et al., 1996), supple-
mented by items about leaving the room and inwardly
calming oneself down. Items were ordered so that
they assessed first behavioral (11 items) and then
mental (9 items) forms of neutralizing. Examples of
behavioral neutralizing are ripping the paper with the
sentence or changing the name. Examples of mental
forms of neutralizing are thinking about something
positive or saying a prayer. First, the experimenter
observed whether the participant had performed any
behavioral neutralizing strategies. Subsequently, the
experimenter asked the participant whether he or she
had used any mental neutralizing strategies. The pres-
ence of behavioral or mental neutralizing was rated by
the experimenter as either 0 (absent) or 1 (present).
Given that the participants mostly performed only one
behavior to neutralize the UIT, we analyzed beha-
vioral neutralizing as a dichotomous variable (per-
formed vs. did not perform). The final score for
mental neutralizing was the number of different stra-
tegies used to neutralize the UIT per participant (sum
score), since all participants but one used at least one
mental neutralizing strategy. For a detailed descrip-
tion of the neutralizing assessment, see the Appendix.
UIT activation. The UIT activation was identical to that
of the previous study (Wahl et al., 2019) and was
based on a previous paradigm used to study charac-
teristics of neutralizing in nonclinical samples (Rach-
man et al., 1996; van den Hout et al., 2001, 2002).
First, we provided the participants with a pen and a
sheet of paper and asked them to think of a loved
person and to get a vivid image of that person in their
mind. Once they had a clear picture in their mind, they
were instructed to write down and subsequently to
read aloud the following sentence: “I wish that [loved
person] would die today in a horrible car accident.”
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Three participants refused to write down the sentence
and two did not read it aloud.
Thought monitoring. During the thought-monitoring
phases, participants were instructed to observe their
own thoughts for 5 min and to assess the UIT fre-
quency using the counter app, in the same way as in
Wahl et al. (2019). The instructions were as follows:
During the next 5 min, you may think about anything
you like. You might think of your target unwanted intru-
sive thought, but you do not have to. However, if at any
time you think of your target unwanted intrusive
thought, please record the occurrence of each thought
by pressing the “þ” key on the smartphone once for
each occurrence. It is important that you continue in the
same way for the full 5 min. (adapted from Marcks &
Woods, 2005)
Experimental manipulation. Following Wahl et al.
(2019), we randomly assigned participants to the three
groups: UIT rumination, mood rumination, or distrac-
tion. During the experimental manipulation, they
were instructed to focus their attention on statements
presented to them on a computer screen for 8 min.
Each experimental condition used 28 statements to
induce a designated thinking style or distraction. The
participants could use the mouse to navigate through
the statements.
To induce rumination about the UIT, we used a
modified version of the rumination task by Morrow
and Nolen-Hoeksema (1990), which was identical to
the one used by Wahl et al. (2019). The participants
assigned to this condition were asked to focus on the
reasons for, implications of, and possible conse-
quences of their activated UIT (e.g., “Think about:
the possible consequences of having intrusive
thoughts or images”). In the rumination about nega-
tive mood condition, the participants had to focus on
reasons for, meanings of, and possible consequences
of their negative mood (e.g., “Think about: the way
you feel inside”). This induction was based on the
depressive rumination paradigm (Blagden & Craske,
1996; Huffziger & Kuehner, 2009; Lyubomirsky
et al., 2003; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990). In
the distraction condition, the participants were asked
to distract themselves by thinking about everyday
objects and situations. (e.g., “Think about: raindrops
sliding down a window pane”). This condition was
based on the original distraction task (Huffziger &
Kuehner, 2009; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990).
Procedure
The experimental procedure of the study is depicted
in Figure 1. To administer the study, we used the
online survey tool Unipark (Questback GmbH,
2013). All participants gave their written informed
consent and were tested individually in a quiet room,
seated in front of a computer screen. At the beginning,
participants were randomly allocated to one of the
Figure 1. Experimental procedure. The additions that extend Wahl et al. (2019) are marked in bold. BDI ¼ Beck
Depression Inventory; OCI-R ¼ Obsessive–Compulsive Inventory, Revised; PANAS ¼ Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule; ROII ¼ Revised Obsessive Intrusions Inventory; RRS-brood ¼ Ruminative Responses Scale-brooding subscale;
TAFS ¼ Thought–Action Fusion Scale; T1 ¼ before baseline; T2 ¼ after baseline; T3 ¼ after experimental manipulation;
T4 ¼ after return to baseline; UIT ¼ unwanted intrusive thought; VAS ¼ visual analog scale. Adapted from K. Wahl et al.
(2019). Copyright 2018 by Elsevier. Adapted with permission.
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three experimental groups and completed a set of
standardized questionnaires (PANAS, OCI-R, BDI,
RRS-brood, TAFS), followed by the activation of the
UIT. The activation of the UIT was immediately fol-
lowed by the first ratings on the VAS (distress, urge to
neutralize, and depressed mood, at T1). Participants
were subsequently asked to monitor and register their
thoughts for 5 min (baseline), followed by the second
ratings (distress, urge to neutralize, and depressed
mood) on the VAS (T2). Participants were then asked
to follow one of the three instructions of the experi-
mental manipulation for 8 min, succeeded by a third
rating of the VAS scales (distress, urge to neutralize,
depressed mood, and UIT vividness, at T3). The study
continued with the second thought-monitoring phase
(return to baseline), followed by the fourth VAS rat-
ings at T4 (distress, urge to neutralize, and depressed
mood) and the completion of the ROII items and
manipulation checks. Finally, behavioral and mental
neutralizing were assessed. The procedure was iden-
tical to the procedure used in the study by Wahl et al.
(2019) with the addition of three components: TAF
was assessed as part of the questionnaire set at the
beginning of the study, UIT vividness was assessed
as part of the VAS ratings at T3, and behavioral and
mental neutralizing were assessed at the end of the
study.
Statistical analysis
Data were analyzed with IBM SPSS Statistics 23.
First, we used box plots and z scores to identify out-
liers and detected four in UIT frequency. To reduce
the bias, we applied Winsorizing by replacing these
outliers with the next highest score that was not an
outlier (Field, 2013). Next, we examined the assump-
tion of normality, allowing small violations because
our sample size included more than 30 participants
per group (Field, 2013). To test whether the experi-
mental groups differed in sociodemographic vari-
ables, clinical characteristics, or degree of
concentration (first manipulation check), we used
one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs). We per-
formed a w2 test to compare the groups on gender.
To investigate whether the experimental groups dif-
fered in the expected directions during the experimen-
tal manipulation (second manipulation check), we
conducted a 3  2 mixed-model ANOVA with group
(UIT rumination, mood rumination, and distraction)
as between-subjects factor and content of thinking
(self-focus vs. UIT focus) as a within-subject factor.
We additionally carried out this analysis just for the
rumination groups with a 2  2 mixed-model design,
excluding distraction.
To examine Hypotheses 1 and 2 (a, b, and c), the
outcome variables (distress, urge to neutralize, and
depressed mood) were calculated as the mean differ-
ence between T2 and T3. We focused on these two
time points as the crucial interval since they were
immediately before and after the experimental manip-
ulation and could also be directly compared with the
Wahl et al.’s (2019) study. The outcome variable UIT
frequency was calculated as the mean difference
between the two thought-monitoring phases (baseline
and return to baseline). Planned contrasts were con-
ducted comparing the UIT rumination group with the
combined mood rumination and distraction groups.
Where necessary, we adjusted for heterogeneity of
variances. To analyze the effect of rumination about
the UIT on behavioral and mental neutralizing
(Hypothesis 3a and b), we conducted a logistic regres-
sion and a Welch test (due to slight heterogeneity of
variances on this variable), respectively.
To investigate the moderating effects of trait rumi-
nation and TAF (Hypothesis 4a and b), we conducted
moderation analyses using PROCESS (Hayes, 2017).
For the interactions, we report percentile bootstrap
95% confidence intervals (CIs), because this method
is more robust than the standard CI (Field, 2013).
Significant moderation effects were followed by a
simple slopes analysis (Aiken & West, 1991; Rogosa,
1981). This analysis looks at the relation between the
predictor and outcome at 1 SD above and below the
mean value of the moderator. Specifically, we looked
at the effect of rumination about the UIT on the urge
to neutralize from T2 to T3 at lower (1 SD below
mean), average (mean), and higher (1 SD above
mean) levels of trait rumination and TAF, respec-
tively. Urge to neutralize from T2 to T3 was calcu-
lated as the mean difference between these two time
points. To analyze the effect of rumination about the
UIT on UIT appraisals (Hypothesis 5), we carried out
a multivariate ANOVA, which tests the difference
between groups across multiple outcomes simultane-
ously and therefore controls better for multiple testing
(Field, 2013). Last, changes in UIT vividness were
analyzed with an ANOVA, followed by Tukey’s post
hoc test.
As effect sizes, we report Pearson’s correlation
coefficient (r; planned contrasts), partial eta-squared
(Z2p; one-way independent and mixed ANOVAs), odds
ratios (ORs; logistic regression), and Cohen’s (d;
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First, we analyzed whether participants were able to
concentrate on the statements provided during the
experimental manipulation. Results showed that on
average, all participants were able to focus to a high
degree on the statements, with no significant group
differences, F(2, 102) ¼ 0.36, p ¼ .696 (see Table 2
for all manipulation check means and SDs). Next, we
investigated differences between groups on the con-
tent of thinking. We expected that distraction would
lead to lower scores on self-focus and UIT focus in
comparison to rumination about the UIT and rumina-
tion about negative mood. In addition, we predicted
that the rumination groups would differ from each
other in the content being ruminated on (self-focus
vs. UIT focus), with rumination about the UIT being
more UIT focused and rumination about negative
mood being more self-focused. A significant interac-
tion between the experimental group and the content
of rumination with the expected patterns suggests that
three distinct thinking styles were successfully
induced, F(2, 102) ¼ 6.41, p ¼ .002, Z2p ¼ :11. The
interaction remained significant when excluding dis-
traction from the analysis, F(1, 67) ¼ 8.47, p ¼ .005,
Z2p ¼ :11, meaning that the two types of rumination
differed in the expected direction (self-focus vs. UIT
focus). In short, the experimental manipulation was
successfully implemented.
Replication
Hypothesis 1: Effect of experimental manipulation
on urge to neutralize.
Table 3 presents means and SDs for urge to neu-
tralize for each time point. The analysis focuses on the
comparison between T2 and T3. Urge to neutralize
showed an attenuated decline in those participants
who had previously ruminated about their UIT
compared to participants who had ruminated
about negative mood and those who were dis-
tracted, t(81.58) ¼ 2.74, p ¼ .007, r ¼ .29. For
illustration and comparison with the study by
Wahl et al. (2019), means and standard errors of
the urge to neutralize are depicted graphically in
Figure 2.
Hypothesis 2a, b, and c: Effects of experimental
manipulation on distress, depressed mood, and UIT
frequency.
Table 3 presents means and SDs for distress,
depressed mood, and UIT frequency. Similar to urge
to neutralize, distress showed an attenuated decline
from T2 to T3 in those participants who were in the
UIT rumination group compared to participants who
were in the mood rumination and distraction groups,
t(102) ¼ 2.45, p ¼ .016, r ¼ .24. The effect of rumi-
nation about the UIT on depressed mood was not
significant, t(102) ¼ 1.56, p ¼ .121, r ¼ .15. Figure 3
shows the effects for distress and depressed mood.
With regard to UIT frequency, there was no signifi-
cant difference between the experimental groups,
t(102) ¼ 0.45, p ¼ .656, r ¼ .04.
Additional analysis: Rumination about negative mood
versus distraction. Visual inspection of the data
(Figures 2 and 3) and the means in Table 3 suggest
that the two rumination groups followed a similar
pattern, that is, a reduced decline in comparison to
distraction. Thus, we decided to conduct an additional
contrast to test the differences between rumination
about negative mood and distraction for statistical
significance. Relative to distraction, rumination
about negative mood maintained the urge to neutra-
lize, t(60.84) ¼ 3.42, p ¼ .001, r ¼ .40; distress,
Table 2. Manipulation checks by experimental group.
Variable
Experimental group
UIT rumination (n ¼ 34) Mood rumination (n ¼ 35) Distraction (n ¼ 36)
Concentration 82.06 (15.81) 83.14 (13.77) 84.86 (11.96)
Content of thinking
Self-focus 73.32 (26.47) 84.57 (24.02) 30.14 (28.29)
UIT focus 62.82 (32.55) 49.20 (34.63) 19.31 (22.80)
Note. Values are means with standard deviations in parentheses. UIT ¼ unwanted intrusive thought.
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t(102)¼ 2.15, p¼ .034, r¼ .21; and depressed mood,
t(102) ¼ 3.54, p ¼ .001, r ¼ .33, from T2 to T3.
Extension
Hypothesis 3a and b: Effect of experimental
manipulation on behavioral and mental
neutralizing.
There was no significant effect of the experimental
manipulation on behavioral neutralizing,1 b ¼ 0.65,
SE ¼ 0.50, p ¼ .196, OR ¼ 1.92, 95% CI [0.715,
5.157] (UIT rumination vs. distraction), b ¼ 0.19,
SE ¼ 0.54, p ¼ .731, OR ¼ 0.83, 95% CI [0.288,
2.392] (UIT rumination vs. mood rumination), or
mental neutralizing, F(2, 67.63) ¼ 1.20, p ¼ .309,
Table 3. Distress, urge to neutralize, depressed mood, UIT frequency, mental neutralizing, UIT appraisals, and UIT
vividness by experimental group with time points.
Variable
Experimental group
UIT rumination (n ¼ 34) Mood rumination (n ¼ 35) Distraction (n ¼ 36)
Distress
T1 5.82 (2.14) 5.89 (1.57) 6.17 (1.98)
T2 3.62 (2.09) 4.40 (1.90) 4.31 (2.54)
T3 3.59 (2.18) 3.94 (2.14) 3.00 (2.08)
T4 2.44 (1.97) 3.09 (2.16) 2.44 (1.78)
Urge to neutralize
T1 6.24 (2.66) 6.26 (2.58) 6.47 (2.62)
T2 4.50 (2.70) 4.29 (2.41) 4.94 (2.86)
T3 3.68 (2.91) 3.31 (2.39) 2.33 (2.27)
T4 2.74 (2.60) 2.66 (2.20) 2.56 (2.37)
Depressed mood
T1 4.68 (2.53) 4.20 (2.40) 4.67 (2.41)
T2 3.12 (2.29) 3.06 (1.96) 3.56 (2.32)
T3 3.15 (2.34) 3.26 (2.25) 2.22 (2.02)
T4 2.24 (2.06) 2.74 (1.93) 2.08 (1.96)
UIT frequency
Baseline 17.82 (16.26) 15.74 (12.29) 19.67 (15.49)
Return to baseline 12.41 (18.42) 11.20 (18.22) 11.22 (10.02)
Mental neutralizing 4.88 (1.45) 5.23 (1.52) 4.61 (1.89)
UIT appraisals (ROII)
Unpleasantness 3.03 (1.14) 2.74 (1.17) 2.67 (1.12)
Guilt 2.06 (1.23) 1.91 (1.36) 1.89 (1.28)
Worry 1.50 (1.02) 1.54 (1.34) 1.28 (1.11)
Unacceptability 2.59 (1.21) 2.00 (1.26) 2.58 (1.20)
Likelihood 0.71 (0.72) 0.77 (0.65) 0.61 (0.60)
Control 2.26 (1.08) 2.14 (1.22) 1.72 (1.32)
Harm/danger 1.00 (1.10) 0.91 (1.10) 0.92 (0.94)
Responsibility 1.29 (1.14) 1.09 (1.27) 1.19 (1.09)
UIT vividness at T3 4.03 (2.62) 3.29 (3.03) 2.50 (2.89)
Note. Values are means with standard deviations in parentheses. ROII ¼ Revised Obsessive Intrusions Inventory; T1 ¼ before baseline;
T2 ¼ after baseline; T3 ¼ after experimental manipulation; T4 ¼ after return to baseline; UIT ¼ unwanted intrusive thought.
Figure 2. Means of urge to neutralize by group (UIT
rumination, mood rumination, and distraction). Error bars
represent standard errors. UIT ¼ unwanted intrusive
thought.
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Z2p ¼ :03. Means and SDs of mental neutralizing are
presented in Table 3.
Mechanisms
Hypothesis 4a and b: Moderating effects of trait
rumination and TAF.
When comparing rumination about the UIT with
distraction, trait rumination did not moderate the
effect of the experimental manipulation on the urge
to neutralize, b ¼ 0.28, percentile 95% CI [0.637,
0.027], t¼2.25, p¼ .027, since the percentile boot-
strap CI included zero. TAF moderated the relation
between the experimental group and the urge to neu-
tralize from T2 to T3, b ¼ 0.09, percentile 95% CI
[0.155, 0.012], t ¼ 2.33, p ¼ .022, when com-
paring rumination about the UIT with distraction.
When comparing rumination about negative mood
with distraction, the moderation was not significant,
b ¼ 0.07, percentile 95% CI [0.145, 0.010],
t ¼ 1.98, p ¼ .051. Further analysis showed that
the effect of TAF occurred only in the distraction
group and not in the two rumination groups (see
Table 4). Specifically, when TAF score increased,
so did the mean difference in urge to neutralize from
T2 to T3; that is, urge to neutralize decreased to a
greater degree.
Hypothesis 5: Effect of experimental manipulation
on UIT appraisals.
We did not find evidence for an effect of rumina-
tion about the UIT on the UIT appraisals, V ¼ 0.15,
F(16, 192) ¼ 0.96, p ¼ .504 (for means and SDs, see
Table 3).
Exploratory analysis: Effect of rumination on UIT vividness.
The effect of the experimental group on the UIT
vividness was not significant, F(2, 102) ¼ 2.51,
p ¼ .086, Z2p ¼ :05 (for means and SDs, see Table 3).
Discussion
The major goal of the study was to investigate
whether rumination about a UIT reduces the natural
decline of the urge to neutralize these thoughts
relative to rumination about negative mood and
Figure 3. Means of distress and depressed mood by group (UIT rumination, mood rumination, and distraction). Error
bars represent standard errors. UIT ¼ unwanted intrusive thought.
Table 4. Conditional effects of TAF on urge to neutralize





T2 to T3 t p
UIT rumination M 1 SD 0.94 0.40 .691
M 0.81
M þ1 SD 0.68
Mood rumination M 1 SD 0.90 0.21 .830
M 0.97
M þ1 SD 1.03
Distraction M 1 SD 1.63 3.00 .003
M 2.55
M þ1 SD 3.46
Note. The moderation occurred only in the distraction group,
which is highlighted by the significant t statistic. As TAF score
increased, so did the effect of distraction on the urge to neutra-
lize. TAF ¼ Thought–Action Fusion.
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distraction, thereby replicating findings by Wahl et al.
(2019). Consistent with Hypothesis 1, rumination
about the UIT attenuated the general decline of the
urge to neutralize the UIT relative to rumination about
negative mood and distraction. Interestingly, we
observed a similar effect on the urge to neutralize for
individuals who had ruminated about negative mood,
relative to those in the distraction group. In other
words, individuals who ruminated—irrespective of
the content of rumination—experienced a reduced
decline in the urge to neutralize compared to individ-
uals who were distracted. Findings partially replicate
results by Wahl et al. (2019) who used a novel experi-
mental paradigm for the first time. This replication in
an independent sample further strengthens our confi-
dence in the assumption that rumination about a UIT
is involved in the maintenance of the urge to act upon
these thoughts.
In contrast to the previous study (Wahl et al.,
2019), rumination about the UIT also attenuated the
decline of distress associated with the UIT, relative to
rumination about the negative mood and distraction
(Hypothesis 2a). These findings suggest that rumina-
tion about the UIT is involved not only in the main-
tenance of the urge to neutralize but possibly also in
the persistence of the distress experienced with the
UIT. It is possible that the nonsignificant effect on
distress found earlier represented a power problem,
as Wahl et al. (2019) assessed a smaller sample. In
addition, rumination about negative mood maintained
both the distress associated with the UIT and
depressed mood, relative to distraction. The present
findings suggest that the two types of rumination
exerted similar effects on the urge to neutralize and
distress. The reasons for this discrepancy in the
effects of rumination about negative mood between
the previous study (Wahl et al., 2019) and the current
study are unclear. Manipulation checks in both studies
indicate that two distinct types of rumination were
successfully induced to a similar degree, using iden-
tical methodology. The differences between rumina-
tion on UIT and rumination on negative mood seem to
be particularly relevant for individuals diagnosed with
OCD (Wahl, Schönfeld et al., 2011), and future stud-
ies should retain this distinction and investigate
whether they differ in their effects on OC symptoms.
Neither the current nor the previous study (Wahl
et al., 2019) found an effect of the experimental
manipulation on the frequency of UITs (Hypothesis
2c). Whether this can be interpreted as a robust find-
ing, meaning that the frequency of UITs is unaffected
by previous rumination, or whether the findings are
attributable to methodological difficulties such as
the reliable and valid assessment of such transient
phenomena as UITs remain to be seen in future stud-
ies, which could develop valid assessments of UITs
that also differentiate between frequency and dura-
tion of UITs.
The second aim was to extend the previous find-
ings by investigating whether also actual behavioral
and mental neutralizing are affected by rumination.
Although the effect was going in the predicted direc-
tion (i.e., participants in the UIT rumination group
performing behavioral neutralizing more often than
participants in the distraction group), the experimen-
tal groups did not significantly differ in their effect on
behavioral neutralizing (Hypothesis 3a). This means
that participants in each group engaged in actual neu-
tralizing behavior such as ripping the paper or cross-
ing out the name of the loved person to a similar
degree. Likewise, rumination about the UIT did not
result in a higher frequency of mental neutralizing
strategies compared to rumination about the negative
mood and distraction (Hypothesis 3b). Each group
engaged in a high total number of mental neutralizing
strategies (UIT rumination: M ¼ 4.88, SD ¼ 1.45;
mood rumination: M ¼ 5.23, SD ¼ 1.52; distraction:
M ¼ 4.61, SD ¼ 1.89), such as saying silently to
oneself that the sentence “does not count” since one
was told to write it down to fulfill the requirements of
the study. Thus, the lack of group differences might be
explained by a ceiling effect, attributable to the strong
activation of a UIT. In sum, results do not support
Hypothesis 3a and b. Future studies should address this
question with more power and a more refined assess-
ment of actual behavioral and mental neutralizing.
Several potential mechanisms involved in the asso-
ciations between rumination and UITs were addressed
in this study in a conjunct analysis to better under-
stand how exactly rumination impacts the mainte-
nance of UITs. We did not find evidence of trait
rumination or TAF moderating the effect of rumina-
tion about the UIT on the urge to neutralize (Hypoth-
esis 4a and b). Thus, it appears that rumination about a
UIT affects the urge to neutralize regardless of the
tendency to ruminate in daily life, or the predisposi-
tion to misinterpret the occurrence and meaning of
UITs. Additionally, we did not find that rumination
directly affected the appraisals of the UIT (e.g., rumi-
nation did not increase the perceived likelihood of the
thought coming true, relative to distraction), which is
consistent with the finding on TAF. Future studies
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might focus on the assessment of key misinterpreta-
tions of UITs and their potential changes as a result of
rumination.
Finally, we examined whether rumination about
the UIT influenced the vividness of the UIT. Findings
suggest that vividness did not differ between the
groups. Future studies might want to include more
aspects of imagery related to UITs to draw conclu-
sions about their possible involvement in the effects
of rumination on UITs.
There are several limitations to this study that
should be addressed. First, the use of one-item mea-
sures as the main dependent variables poses questions
about their psychometric properties. Second, the cur-
rent and the previous study (Wahl et al., 2019) did not
find an effect of rumination about the UIT on the fre-
quency of UITs. These findings are surprising, given
that in the current study rumination about the UIT had a
broader impact on variables (urge to neutralize and
distress). This raises the question of whether the use
of a smartphone to assess frequency of UITs is a valid
and reliable measure. Future studies might consider
other measures of intrusive thoughts, for instance, the
think-aloud approach (Zanov & Davison, 2010) or
thought sampling (Hirsch et al., 2015). Finally, repli-
cations of key findings should ideally be conducted by
an independent research group. Although the study
was double blind, it cannot be completely ruled out
that the previous experiences with the experimental
paradigm or the researchers’ expectations might have
influenced the current results.
To conclude, the study replicated the main result
from a previous study (Wahl et al., 2019) that rumina-
tion about a UIT attenuates the decrease in urge to
neutralize compared to rumination about negative
mood and distraction. Given the additional findings
that rumination about the UIT affected distress, this
strengthens the confidence in the argument that rumi-
nation has an influence on the maintenance of UITs.
Findings are also consistent with previous studies sug-
gesting that rumination might play a role in OCD (Dar
& Iqbal, 2015; Grisham & Williams, 2009; Raines
et al., 2017; Wahl et al., 2019). Findings warrant repli-
cation in individuals diagnosed with OCD to investi-
gate whether rumination also affects obsessive
thoughts in the same way as it affects UITs.
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1. We changed the assignment of three strategies. The
experimenter included two strategies (“I don’t wish that
on anyone” and “it is not my wish but a task in the
study”) in the behavioral neutralizing subscale (item:
“Other”) that we did not consider as observable and
hence categorized as mental neutralizing. In the mental
neutralizing subscale (item: “Other”), one participant
reported having looked out of the window as a strategy.
This was an observable act. Therefore, we recategorized
it as behavioral neutralizing.
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Appendix
Assessment of neutralizing
The behavioral neutralizing items were tailored to
cover strategies that were identified by Rachman et
al. (1996), including (a) canceling out (e.g., ripping
the paper with the sentence), (b) counter-balancing
(e.g., changing the sentence so it says something pos-
itive), and (c) reassurance seeking (e.g., sending a
message to the person written in the sentence). We
also included a modified item from the Yale -Brown
Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Goodman et al., 1989)
assessing forms of superstitious behavior (e.g., knock-
ing on wood, touching a crucifix, etc.). Further, we
also used a self-developed item: leaving the room.
With regard to the mental neutralizing items, we
focused on mental strategies that a participant could
employ to neutralize the activated UIT. The items
were taken and modified primarily from the ROII Part
2 (Purdon . . . Clark, 1993, 1994), for example, trying
to argue that everything was all right or praying. One
item concerning the relevance of the intrusive
thoughts was modified from the Cognitive Intrusions
Questionnaire (Freeston et al., 1991) and one was
self-developed: “ . . . to inwardly calm oneself down.”
The investigator gave the paper with the written
UIT to the participant and assessed whether he or she
showed any behavioral strategies to neutralize the
activated UIT. Subsequently, the experimenter con-
tinued to assess mental strategies.
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